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Security: A General Principle of 
Social Security Law in Europe 
Edited by Ulrich Becker, Danny Pieters, Friso Ross, Paul Schoukens 
PART I LEGISLATIVE AsPEcrs* 
1 State obligation to introduce and maintain social security 
1.1 Social security in the Swiss federal state 
Switzerland is a federal state with 7·5 million inhabitants. The 
local and demographic structure of the 26 states (Cantons) is based on histori-
cal developments. The Cantons differ substantially in their number of inhabit-
ants (from Appenzell Inner Rhodes with 14,700 inhabitants to Zurich with 
1,250,ooo inhabitants) and their territorial size (from Basel City with 26 km2 to 
Grisons with 7,105 km2) .1 
The central state (Confederation) has the competence for legislation if the 
Federal Constitution contains explicit authorisations (Arts. 3 and 42 Constitu-
tion'). In the last 150 years the Federal Constitution has undergone several 
partial changes. The Confederation acquired substantial competences in almost 
all fields of modern legislation. Nevertheless, the Cantons retained a remarkable 
inftuence on federallegislation. Furthermore, the Cantons are-in many fields 
- responsible for the execution of the federallaw. According to the principle of 
subsidiarity, the competences of the Cantons should not be restricted more than 
needed. The Confederation shall (only) assume the tasks which require uniform 
regulation (Art. 42 al. 2 Constitution). This federal principle of subsidiarity will 
be strengthened by the general principle of subsidiarity which entered into force 
in January 2oo8.J 
The complete reform of the Swiss Constitution, which entered into force 
on January 1, 2000, did not change the principles of the old Swiss Constitu-
tion from 1874. It was meant as a formal revision in order to reach a clear basis 
for further reforms. In 2004 a set of provisions concerning the competences 
and tasks of Confederation and Cantons was adopted and entered into force 
in 2008.4 Apart from the already mentioned general principle of subsidiarity 
the competences in some fields of social security will be clarified by these new 
norms.S 
Thanks to my assistant Myriam Schwendener for her valuable help. 
1 See for further details Thomas FleinerfAlexander MisicfNicole Töpperwien, Swiss Constitutional Law, 
The HaguefBerne 2005, N 42 et seq. 
2 The Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of April 18, '999 (Constitution) , Official systematic 
Collection of Swiss Legislation (SR) 101. See for an (inofficial) english translation of the Constitution 
http://www.admin.chfchfitlfrsfi/cioiENG.pdf. 
3 Art. sa Constitution. 
4 Bundesbeschluss zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund 
und Kantonen, Bundesblatt (BBl) 2003 6591. 
5 E.g. Art. n2 al. 3 and 4 Constitution (financing of the old age, survivors and disabilities insurance), 
Art. n2a Constitution (definitive competence for the system of complementary benefits) , Art. n2b 
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The Confederation has the competence to adopt legislation in most fields of 
social security, as defined in ILO convention No. 102. Due to the specific Swiss 
approach to direct democracy (right of initiative to change the Constitution, 
compulsory referendum with the requirement of a double majority for changes 
of the Constitution6), the constitutional norms which authorise the Confedera-
tion to adopt legislation are often very detailed and contain already the core 
principles of the legislation to adopt? 
Social assistance is the last field of social policy to remain almost entirely in 
the legislative competence of the Cantons. The Constitution (Art. 115 Constitu-
tion) declares that the state of residence is responsible for persons in need of 
social assistance. In the same provision the Confederation is declared competent 
for legislation concerning exceptions in intercantanal relations. 8 
1.2 Legal basis of social security 
r.2.r Federallevel 
The Federal Constitution from 1874 did not include any specific 
rules concerning social security. Apart from the provisions empowering the 
Confederation to legislate in matters of social security, only the general goal of 
'welfare', mentioned in Art. 2 of the former Federal Constitution, was known. 
The new Federal Constitution has a clear structure and contains many explicit 
provisions in the field of social security. Most of them have been acknowledged 
by political and judicial practice before the adoption of the new Constitution. 
Aspects of social security are touched by several norms. These norms have 
different structures; some of them only set vague goals to the legislature, others 
determine clear cut duties to provide specific protection for social risks: 
The prologue ofthe Federal Constitution enclosing a solemn declaration ofthe 
basic values of the Confederation already mentions welfare of people in urgent 
needs as a maxim of the Confederation. The binding force of the prologue is 
very weak, but the same values are repeated in other provisions of the Constitu-
tion which have greater legal impact. 
The generat goals of the Federal Confederation are mentioned in Art. 2 
Constitution. Among those goals 'common welfare' and 'equality of chances' 
figure as central values .9 The function of the rather abstract provision is to 
give a general direction to governmental action. In addition to the general 
~~ -- -- ~~ -----
Constitution (integration of disabled persons). Art. II2c Constitution (care and help for disabled and old 
persons). 
Art. 140 Constitution. 
7 E.g. At. rrr- u4 Constitution. 
See the Federal Law on the competence for the assistance of people in need, SR 851.1. (Alllegislation 
quoted in this paper can be found under its systematic number [SR] on thi s site: www.admin .chfchfd/ 
srfsr.html. 
9 Art. 2 al. 2 and 3 Constitution. 
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goal of welfare, Art. 94 Constitution mentions welfare as a central objective of 
economic policy. This means that within economic policy the goals of social 
welfare must be observed. 
Following the example of several modern foreign constitutions as weil as a 
couple of new cantonal constitutions, the Federal Constitution makes a distinc-
tion between social goals (Sozialziele} and social rights (Sozialrechte). The 
social goals are binding for state authorities but do not give subjective rights to 
individuals,ro whereas social rights arefundamental rights granting subjective 
constitutional rights to individuals. In the Federal Constitution only the right to 
basic aid in situations of distress (Art. 12} and the right to a sufficient, free and 
confessional neutral education in public schools (Art. 19} are acknowledged to 
be social rights." 
The core provision of social security in the Swiss Constitution - directly 
following the catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms - is Art. 41 (social 
goals). The Confederation and the Cantons shall strive to ensure that, in addition 
to personal responsibility and private initiative, 
- every person shall benefit from social security; 
- every person shall benefit from necessary health care; 
- the family as a community of adults and children shall be protected and 
encouraged; 
- every person capable of working shall sustain hirnself or herself through 
working under fair and adequate conditions; 
- every person looking for housing shall find, for hirnself or herself and his 
or her family, appropriate housing at reasonable conditions; 
- children and young people and people of working age shall benefit from 
initial and continuing education according to their abilities; 
- children and young people shall be encouraged in their development to 
become independent and socially responsible persons, and they shall be 
supported in their social, cultural, and political integration. 
Furthermore, the Confederation and the Cantons shall - within the frame-
work of their constitutional powers - strive to ensure that every person shall be 
insured against the economic consequences of old age, disability, disease or sick-
ness, accident, unemployment, maternity, orphanhood, and widowhood.12 
The incorporation of social goals was very controversial during the process 
of the constitutional reform. Contrary to the hard debates, the implementation 
of the social goals did not cause any problems. It has even been shown that 
the legal impact of the social goals is marginal. 'J Social goals are hardly ever 
See Art. 41 al. 4 ofthe Swiss Constitution stating no direct subjective rights to state benefits may be 
derived from the social goals. 
TI See Part I, '-3· 
1 2 Art. 41 al. 2 Constitution. 
' 3 See Deniz Danaci, Der Einfluss der Sozialziele auf die Beschlüsse der Bundesversammlung seit dem 
I nierafttreten der neuen Bundesverfassung. Jusletter vom 30. April zoo7 (www.jusletter.ch). 
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mentioned during the elaboration of new legislation. It cannot be said that social 
goals have already turned out to motivate legislation in matters of social security. 
The goals are also formulated too vaguely to block or to Iimit changes within the 
existing social security system in an effective way. ' 4 
As already mentioned above, the provisions which authorise the Confedera-
tion are often very detailed and contain in several cases the duty - and not only 
the authorisation - to adopt legislation: 
- The Confederation shalllegislate on fair compensation for those who 
perform military or an alternative service. Persons rendering military or 
an alternative service and thereby suffering health impairments or losing 
their lives, have the right for themselves or their relatives to adequate 
support by the Confederation. '5 Both compulsory tasks have been fulfilled 
by the adoption of the Federal Law on military insurance and the Federal 
Law on Compensation for loss of income. '6 
- The Confederation shall take measures for an adequate social security for 
the elderly, survivors and disabled persons. These shall be based on three 
pillars, namely the federal old age, survivors and disability insurance, 
the employee pension plans and the provision by individuals for their 
own future (Art. III al. I Constitution) . Apart from this general concept 
of the tree pillars and the compulsory task to create these social security 
systems, the Constitution includes quite narrow guidelines to the legis-
lature (Arts . n2 and II3 Constitution). The Federal Law on old age and 
survivors insurance,'7 the Federal Law on disability insurance'8 and the 
Federal Law on old age, survivors and disability insurance for employed 
persons'9 implement the concept of the three pillars. 
If the Ievel of insurance prestations of the first pillar (old-age and survi-
vors insurance and disability insurance) is not sufficient to cover basic 
living expenses appropriately (Art. II2 al. 2 lit. b Constitution), the system 
of complementary benefits - which is not the same as social assistancezo 
- grants prestations to achieve this Ievel (Art. I96 No. ro Constitution; 
this provisionwill be replaced by a new Art. n2a Constitution by January 
I, 2008). 
- The legislation on unemployment insurance is also a legal duty of the 
Confederation (Art. n4 al. I Constitution). Above this duty the Confedera-
tion may legislate on social assistance to the unemployed (Art. n4 al. 2 
------ -- -- ----
'
4 E.g. Giovanni Biaggini, Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Kommentar, 
Zürich 2 007, Art. 4' N 2 . 
' 5 Art. 59 al. 4 and 5 Constitution 
'
6 SR 833.1 and 834.1. 
' 7 SR 8J I.IO. 
'
8 SR 83 r. 2o. 
'
9 SR 83 r. 4o. 
20 
Ralph Jöhl , Ergänzungsleistungen zu AHVflV, in Ulrich Meyer (ed.), Soziale Sicherheit, BaselfGenevaf 
Munich 2 006, N 9· 
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Constitution). Until now there is no federallegislation on social assistance 
to the unemployed whereas the Law on unemployment insurance21 imple-
ments the duty to legislate in this field. 
- The Federation may legislate on family allowances and operate a federal 
family compensation fund (Art. u6 al. 2 Constitution). Apart from the 
family allowances for persons working in agriculture, the federation has 
not made use of this authorisation. Based on a parliamentary initiative, 
a federallaw on family allowances was adopted in a popular referendum 
in 2oo6. The law will harmonize the existing cantonal systems and set 
minimal standards. The Cantons will remain competent to grant higher 
prestations or include self-employed persons in the compulsory system. 
The new federallaw entered into force on January I, 2009. 
- The duty to institute a maternity insurance scheme has been mentioned 
since I946 in the Constitution. It took almost Go years until a federal 
maternity insurance system was adopted. Former projects did not find a 
majority in popular referendums. The maternity insurance system is now 
part of the federallaw on compensation for loss of income, 22 which used 
to be a compensation system only for people performing military or an 
alternative service. 
Based on Art. n7 Constitution the Confederation shalllegislate on health 
and accident insurance. It may declare health and accident insurance 
as compulsory in general or for certain categories of persons. Health 
insurance is mandatory for the whole population since I996; the Law on 
accident insurance>J declares accident insurance mandatory for employed 
persons. 
Among all the provisions mentioned above, the social goals seem to be - at first 
glance - the basis of social security legislation on the federallevel. In fact, their 
legal impact is modest. The basis of the social security systems in force consists 
of the provisions attributing the Confederation the duty or at least the compe-
tence to legislation. • 4 Apart from the authorisation to legislate on social assist-
ance for unemployed people and on family allowances, the Constitution compels 
the federallegislature to adopt legislation. These duties do Iimit changes on the 
federallevel in so far as the Confederation cannot abolish a social insurance 
system without a foregoing change of the Constitution. A change of the Consti-
tution affords a double majority (majority of votes and majority of the votes of 
the Cantons).•5 
If the Federal Parliament does not fulfil the constitutional duties to adopt 
legislation, there are - apart from political pressure - no means to compel the 
" SR 837.o. 
22 SR 834.1. 
2 3 SR 8p.ro. 
2 4 Hans Peter Tschudi, Die Sozialverfassung der Schweiz (Der Sozialstaat) , Bern 1986, p, z6 et seq. 
2 5 Art. 140 Constitution. 
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legislature to adopt the required legislation. The inßuence of the Federal Court 
is limited in this field; it does not have the power to force the federallegislature 
to act according to the Constitution. 26 The example of the maternity insurance 
mentioned above shows that even a clear constitutional duty can remain unful-
filled for decades. 
1.2. 2 State level (Cantons) 
Most social security systems in Switzerland are based on fed-
erallegislation. The Cantons are still competent in matters of social assistance 
and health care as far as the provision of sufficient medical infrastructure is 
concerned. Furthermore, the Cantons fulfil important tasks in the execution of 
federallegislation. 
Since the Cantons are sovereign to organize themselves within the frame-
work given by the Federal Constitution, they all have their own cantonal 
constitutions. The majority of these constitutions have been revised in the last 
decades, a couple of the constitutions are still in revision. Most of them include 
social goals or other norms mandating the Cantons to take measures in the field 
of social security or in matters closely related to social security. Some of the 
cantonal constitutions contain social goals going beyond those of the Federal 
Constitution. Some of the cantonal constitutions also acknowledge social rights 
which go further than the minimal guarantees in the Federal Constitution. 
The Cantons are obliged to grant the prestations vested in the right to aid in 
distress, which will be dealt with hereafter, to every person on their territory. 
Some cantonal constitutions go beyond this minimal standard or specify the 
prestations concerned. In their systems of social assistance, which are based on 
cantonallegislation, the Cantons all grant a better and higher level of protection 
than the minimallevel acknowledged by the right to aid in distress. 
1.3 Subjective rights to social security 
Since 1995 the subjective fundamental right to aid in distress 
has been acknowledged by the practice of the Federal Court. z7 The Federal Court 
did not mention the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCRJ>8 and its Article n in its leading case. Nevertheless, the con-
nection between the recognition of the right to aid in distress and the task inher-
ent to the Treaty namely to grant access to the courts for its fundamental goals 
seems obvious. 2 9 
-- --- --- --- - - ----
26 Art. 190 Constitution. 
2
7 Federal Court BGE 121 I 267. 
28 SR 0.103.1. 
2
9 E.g. )örg KünzliJWalter Kälin, Die Bedeutung des UNO-Paktes über wirtschaftliche und soziale Rechte 
für das schweizerische Recht, in: Walter KälinJGiorgio MalinverniJManfred Nowak, Die Schweiz und 
die UNO-Menschenrechtspakte, 2nd ed., Basel 1997. p. 130 et seq. 
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Since January r, 2000 the right to aid in distress is mentioned in the consti-
tutional catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms: 'Whoever is in a situation 
of distress and is not able to take care for hirnself or herselfhas the right to aid and 
assistance and also the right to means indispensable Jor living in dignity.'JO 
As a fundamental aspect ofhuman dignity the right to aid in distress grants 
minimal help to every human being on Swiss territory independent from his or 
her sex, age, nationality or legal status. Basic condition of the right is an actual 
and factual situation of distressY Such a situation is given if a person does not 
have the basic resources for survival in dignity. The right can only be claimed 
if somebody is not able to help himsel[Jz This important restriction is generally 
understood as an expression of the principle of subsidiarity. 
The core problern of this right is the delimitation of the prestations. Which 
Ievel of social security must be granted to every individual in Switzerland to 
avoid social exclusion and to ensure a life in dignity? The practice of the Federal 
Court has shown that the level of protection is lower than the average level of 
social assistance. For people who are not entitled to stay in Switzerland (e.g. 
refused refugees) the level can be limited to elementary medical aid, elementary 
housing and modest but sufficient food.n For people who are entitled to stay in 
Switzerland for a Ionger period of time the level of protection is higher. It must 
be high enough to avoid social exclusion for a Ionger time spread.H 
The level of protection deduced from the right to aid in distress is rather 
low. Nevertheless, the right to aid in distress Iimits the scope of action within 
legislation. The level ofhealth protection for instance cannot be lowered without 
respecting a Iimit for those people who do not have a health insurance.J5 The 
physical well-being of every person must be ensured.J6 
Apart from the right to aid in distress, no other explicit constitutional rights 
to social security exist. Other social rights in the Federal Constitution concern 
the right to a sufficient and free primary school educationJ7 and- in case oflack-
ing means - the right to free legal assistance and the right to free legal represen-
tation.J8 
JO Art. 12 Constitution. 
3' Biaggini (N 14), Art. 12 N 4; Margrith Bigler-Eggenberger, in Bernhard Ehrenzeller e.a. (ed.), Die 
schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Kommentar, St. GallenjZurich zoo8,Art. 12 N 14 et seq. 
J2 E.g. Federal Court BGE 130 I 7r: A cornmunity can even refuse to grant social assistance when a person 
in need is not willing to take part in a working program. (Federal Court decisions are published in www. 
bger.ch). 
JJ Federal Court BGE 131 I 166. 
34 Bigler-Eggenberger (N. 31), Art. 12 N 35· 
35 See Thomas Gächter, Grenzen der Solidarität? Individuelle Ansprüche auf medizinische Leistungen 
gegenüber der Rechts- und Versichertengemeinschaft, in Individuum und Verband, Festgabe zum 
schweizerischen Juristentag 2006, p. 473 et seq. 
J6 Federal Court BGE 131 I r66 E. 8.2. 
37 Ar t. 19 Constitution. 
J8 Art. 29 al. 3 Constitution. 
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Even though further social rights are not explicitly mentioned in the Federal 
Constitution, some rights can be deduced from the right to equal treatment.J9 
In fact, this is only true for matters which are not regulated by federallaws. As 
far as an inequality in treatment is based on a federallaw, the Federal Court 
is limited in the adjudication of such 'derived' rights. Article 190 Constitution 
Iimits the constitutional jurisdiction of the Federal Court as far as federallaws 
are concerned; the courts have to follow these laws even if they are in contra-
diction with the Constitution. Only in those cases in which federallaws are in 
contradiction with international human rights (as contained in the ECHR) the 
Federal Court does not follow the federallaw. 4o Up until now the principle of 
equality of treatment derived from Art. 14 ECHR or Art. 26 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has not been a 
basis for further reaching rights than granted by the nationallegislation. 
1.4 Influence of intemationallaw on changes in Swiss social 
security law 
Switzerland has ratified a substantial number of international 
instruments concerning matters of social security. Normally, these instruments 
are not signed or ratified until the Ievel of protection granted by the interna-
tional instrument is reached by nationallaw. 4' Generally speaking, the inftuence 
of internationallaw on changes is stronger before a treaty or a convention is 
signed than afterwards. After the signing and the ratification, the inftuence on 
the national practice and legislation is - in most cases - modest. 
Switzerland has signed 47 conventions of the ILO. 4' These conventions have 
had some inftuence on the development oflabour law, especially the protection 
oflabour. In matters of social security the effect of these conventions has never 
been very strong. 
The ECHR had a substantial inftuence on the development of the judicial 
procedure in matters of social security. When Switzerland ratified the ECHR 
it could hardly have been foreseen that the term 'civil rights' in Art. 6 ECHR 
had to be interpreted in the way that the major part of social security law was 
covered by it. 43 Apart form these effects on procedurallaw the ECHR had very 
little inftuence on the development of Swiss social security law. The same is true 
39 Georg Müller, in )ean-Fran~ois Aubert e.a. (ed.), Kommentar zur schweizerischen Bundesverfassung 
von r874, Basel etc. 1995. Art. 4 N 2r. 
4o Federal Court BGE 128 III rr3 . 
4' Hans Peter Tschudi, Entstehung und Entwicklung der schweizerischen Sozialversicherungen, Basel/ 
Frankfurt r989, p. 123. 
4> See the index ofthe conventions ratified by Switzerland, www.seco.admin.chfthemenfoo385/00452/ 
02026/index.html. 
43 See the judgment ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland (Applica-
tion No. 14518/89) from June 24, 1993. See also Ulricb Meyer-Blaser, Der Einfluss der EMRK auf das 
schweizerische Sozialversicherungsrecht, Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht 1994 I, p. 389 et seq. 
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for other international conventions for the protection ofhuman rights (Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], etc.). 
The set of provisions from the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) ratified by Switzerland has already been imple-
mented in Swiss legislation. The major inftuence - or possible inftuence - of 
the convention does not lie in the incentives it gives to nationallegislation; it 
is more the 'prohibition of regression' following from the progressive concept 
of implementation of the covenant, which limits the Swiss legislature in going 
back behind the level of protection achieved. 44 The practice of the Federal Court 
repeated several tim es that the provisions of the I CESCR do not have a direct 
effect on the subjective rights of the individuals. 45 Therefore, it is not probable 
that the prohibition of regression will successfully be claimed by individuals in 
proceedings before the Federal Court. 
2 Legal duties to respect a 'positio:ri of the individual 
2.1 Concept of the right to property 
The legal source of the right to property is Art. 26 Constitution. 
Article r of the first protocol of the ECHR has been signed by the Swiss govern-
ment, but the entire protocol has not yet been ratified. 46 Therefore, the practice 
of the Strasbourg Court does not have a binding inftuence on the Swiss concept 
of the right to property. 
According to the Swiss concept, the right to property is twofold: it protects 
the ownership interests ofindividuals (Bestandesgarantie), and guarantees the 
right to property as an essential and inviolable feature of the Swiss legal order 
(In.stitutsgarantie). This twofold nature is extended by the constitutional guar-
antee of full compensation in case of expropriation or restriction of the right of 
property resembling an expropriation (Art. 26 al. 2 Constitution).47 
2.2 Right to property and social security 
The right to property protects the individual's ownership 
interest in land, tangibles, servitudes, patents and rights in the present given 
situation. 48 While the practice of the Court of Strasbourg recognises the pro-
tection of rights on prestations of social security - at least in as far as they are 
44 KünzlifKälin (N 29), p. no et seq. 
45 E.g. Federal Court BGE 130 I n3 E. 3·3 and 126 I 240 E. 2g. 
46 See for the reasons of the lacking ratification MarkE. Villiger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschen· 
rechtskonvention, 2nd ed., Zurich 1999, N 3r. 
47 FleinerfMisicfTöpperwien (N 1), N 539 et seq. 
48 FleinerfMisicfTöpperwien (N r), N 539· 
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related to contributions to the system49 - the opinions in the Swiss legal doctrine 
are divided. Some authors do not extend the protection of the right to property 
to the prestations of social security;5o an important and growing rninority of 
authors follows the approach of the Court of StrasbourgY They support a more 
functional concept of property, which takes into account the crucial importance 
of prestations of social security for the individualsY 
Because most social security systems are regulated by federallaws which are 
binding on the courts, very few leading cases on this issue exist. Even if a reduc-
tion of prestations feil within the scope of protection of the right to property, 
the Federal Court would be obliged to follow the federallaw.SJ Above this, the 
reduction of prestations has been a rare exception in the last decades. As far as 
the question has been touched on by the Federal Court, the protection of the 
insured person has been denied. 
A minimal standard of existential prestations is guaranteed - as already 
mentioned before - by the right to aid in distress. The Ievel of protection of this 
right is up to a certain extent accessory to the general conditions oflife in a 
given society.H Because of this relation to a general sociallevel, the right to aid 
in distress can Iimit the reduction of prestations if the reduction has the conse-
quence that a person will be endanger ofloosing personal dignity in the context 
of a given society. Until now, the Ievel of social security has never been lowered 
to an extent that this - absolute - Ievel has been touched. 
2.3 Other concepts with influence on changes in social 
security systems 
There are other different concepts to protect individuals or 
whole groups of insured persons from unforeseen changes in social security 
systems. Apart from the concept of rights acquired by a special act and the pro-
tection of confidence, they all have the structure of principles giving guidelines 
to the legislature. Only the two concepts just mentioned could protect individu-
als from changes even against federallegislation. 
49 PhiHpp Mittelberger, Der Eigentumsschutz nach Art. I des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls zur EMRK im 
Lichte der Rechtsprechung der Strassburger Organe, Berne 2000, p. 24 et seq. with references to case 
law; Vi!Hger (N 46) , N 669. 
5o Regina KienerfWalter Kälin, Grundrechte, Berne 2006, p. 285 et seq.; Klaus A. Vallender, in Bernhard 
Ehrenzeller e.a. (ed.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Kommentar, St. Gallen/Zürich 2008, Art. 
26 N 2I et seq. 
5' Giovanni Biaggini, Eigentumsgarantie, in DetlefMerten e.a. (ed.), Handbuch der Grundrechte, Grun-
drechte in der Schweiz und in Liechtenstein, Heidelberg etc. 2007, p. 523 N w; Ulrich HäfelinfGeorg 
Mü llerfFelix Uhlmann, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, sth ed., Zurich etc. 2006, N 2046c; jörg Paul 
MüllerfMarkus Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4th ed., Berne 2008, p. IOIJ . 
5> Biaggini (N SI) , p. 523 N IO. 
53 Biaggini (N SI), p. 523 N IO. 
54 Bigler-Eggenberger (N 3I), Art. 12 N 34 et seq. 
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2.p Rights acquired by a special act (Wohlerworbene Rechte) 
The main content of some legal positions is specially protected 
for reasons of the protection of confidence. These legal positions are so strong 
that they fall under the protection of property rights mentioned above. These 
rights are either acquired by a special act which must be similar to a contract 
or have existed for a very long period of time.ss The latter category of rights has 
no relation to social security. The former category mainly concerns legal posi-
tions acquired by an administrative contract or a legal act similar to a contract. 
This kind of contract is not used in social security law. The rights and duties 
of individuals are laid down in objective norms and are normally not part of an 
administrative contract. Only in cases in which an authority gives guarantees 
concerning social security benefits to one of its civil servants,s6 could the right 
fall into this group of rights. Such guarantees are very seldom in practice. 
A majority of employed persons in Switzerland are covered by the employee 
pensionplan at a higher Ievel than required by the legal minimum. The insur-
ance at a higher level is only possible when the insured person agrees to it 
voluntarily. Thus, a situation occurs which is comparable with the situation 
leading to a right acquired by a special act: the insured person voluntarily makes 
a higher contribution to the system of the employee pension plan in order to be 
in the position to draw better benefits. These contractually acquired rights are in 
principle under the protection of the right to property; nevertheless, jurisdiction 
shows that changes involving considerable adjustrnents of the rights acquired 
by a special act are not prohibited.s7 Even in the employee pension plan (second 
pillar) one can therefore not speak of rights acquired by a special act in the 
proper sense. 
2.3.2 Protedion of confidence 
The protection against arbitrariness and the principle of good 
faith are both fundamental rights (Art. 9 Federal Constitution). The principle 
of good faith has a threefold content: the protection of (subjective) confidence, 
the prohibition of abuse of rights, and the prohibition of actus contrarius (venire 
contra factum proprium).S8 Only the principle of confidence is relevant in the 
present context. It says that acts of an authority which are precise and individu-
alised can establish the confidence of an individual. If the individual acts in 
accordance with the act of the authority, his confidence is protected even if the 
act of the authority was unlawfu}.59 
55 E.g. HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N SI), N roo8 et seq. 
56 Biaggini (N 51), p. 523 N 9· 
57 E.g. Federal Court BGE I33 V 279 . 
58 FleinerfMisicfTöpperwien, N. 479· 
59 E.g. HäfeHnfMüllerfUhlmann (N SI), N 631 et seq. 
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The principle of confidence is primarily significant in the application oflaw, 
not in the legislation. Nevertheless the majority of authors support a concept 
relating to the clear and specific content of a norm. They accept clear and 
unconditional provisions in a norm as a basis of confidence. Go In a very specific 
case the Federal Court followed this concept and acknowledged the principle of 
confidence due to an abstract legal norm. Gr 
2 .3-3 Protedion of collective confidence f Security ofLaw 
The principle of security oflaw has different aspects. In the 
given context the calculability and the continuity of the legal order are at stake. A 
rule camplies with the calculability when it allows citizens planning individual 
actions to rely on it. It must be clear how the authorities would react based on a 
given rule. Tagether with the principle oflegality, calculability forces the legis-
lature to take unambiguous decisions and to express them in clear terms. The 
principle of continuity shall protect individuals in their expectation concerning 
legal changes: Fundamental changes oflegislation should not be adopted sur-
prisingly. Individuals must be able to adjust their situation for the change ofleg-
islation at an early stage. Although this principle is approved,62 its enforcement 
is limited. As to changes of federallegislation, the jurisdiction cannot undertake 
a control of constitutionality (Art. 190 Constitution). As to changes of cantanal 
legislation, an intervention is only indicated in severe cases for the principle of 
continuity is very vague. Nevertheless, there are some cases in which the Federal 
Court has criticised abrupt changes oflegislation of a canton, because no (suf.. 
ficient) transitional regulations were included. 6J 
2.3-4 Protection of acquired rights 
Acquired rights (Besitzstand) mean that a currently guaranteed 
legal position remains, even though the new right applicable to the case does not 
provide such a position. The protection of acquired rights has a twofold char-
acteristic: it is a concept oflegal coordination and at the same time a (possible) 
concept for transitional measures. 
In the coordination law the protection of acquired rights is important in 
those cases in which a change occurs by the determination of the insurer prima-
rily bound to render benefits. Article 24 al. 4 of the law on disability insurance 
may be cited as an example: If the disability insurance mandates a retraining 
concerning a person having drawn daily allowance from the accident insurance, 
-- -- --- --- -- --
Go E.g. HäfelinfMül!erfUhlmann (N sr), N 63r; Alfred Kölz, Intertemporales Verwaltungsrecht, Zeitschrift 
für schweizerisches Recht 1983 II p. '35 et seq.; Beatrice Weber-Dürler, Vertrauensschutz im öffentli-
chen Recht, Basel/Frankfurt a. M. r983, p. 280 et seq. 
6
' Federal Court BGE 122 V 405 E. pfbb. 
Gz E.g. HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 51), N 343· 
6
J See the cases quoted in HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 51), N 343 et seq. 
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the daily allowance during retraining has at least to correspond to the daily 
allowance drawn from the accident insurance so far. 
Up to now, the protection of acquired rights has not reached the status of 
a general principle oflaw. The jurisdiction explicitly refuses in its constant 
practice to acknowledge the protection of acquired rights as a principle oflaw.G4 
It is also not to be expected that this acknowledgment will happen, because the 
protection of acquired rights would entail substantial financial consequences. 
The protection of acquired rights can only be applied if provided by law. The 
guiding idea of the protection of acquired rights, i.e. that benefits from a social 
insurance shall not be undercut by benefits from another dass of insurance, 
may be considered as an incitement to the legislation to prevent as far as possi-
ble an objective, not justified subsidence of the benefit Ievel. 
In case of changes of the law, it is incumbent on the legislature to take care 
of an appropriate protection oflaw and the protection of confidence respectively, 
the confidence in consistency of the persons affected by the new provision has 
to be weighed against the reform interests of the legislature. Even if difficul-
ties regarding transitionallaw are mainly subject of the legislature competence, 
interests of confidence (legitimate expectations) and legal certainty of every 
individual may not be ignored. Within the doctrine there are quite elaborate 
concepts on how to systemise and weigh the adverse interests caused by transi-
tionallaw conflicts. 65 
2.3.5 Equality and equal treatment 
Also the principle of equality and equal treatment can Iimit the 
scope of action of the legislature: Persons in comparable social circumstances 
may not be treated differently without objective causes. Within the scope of 
reforms, the legislature shall therefore not create unjustified inequalities. 
Moreover, reforms must not Iead to equal treatment in cases in which 
substantial factual differences demand diversity in provision. Especially within 
the usually rather schematic conditions of the claims in the social security law, 
the mandate to differentiate can rarely be applied to the full. 
64 Federal Court BGE 124 V 271 E. 2b. 
65 The most elaborated concept was developed by Ralph Jöhl, Obergangsrechtliche Probleme im Leistung-
srecht der Sozialversicherung, St. Gallen 1996. See for the dogmatic foundation Kölz (N 6r). 
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3 Legal changes and transitional measures 
3.1 Dogmatic approach towards transitional measures 
The legal dogmatic towards transitionallaw and transitional 
measures is quite unanimous in certain points.66 Nevertheless, this consensus 
is based on a rather abstract Ievel. Specific rules and schemes on how transi-
tional measures should be enacted have not yet been developed even though this 
Iack was recognized more than 25 years ago.67 
Apart from the already mentioned legal concepts with influence on legal 
changes, the principle of proportionality is one of the most important guidelines 
in the making of transitional rules. The consensus of the legal opinions based 
on these concepts and principles can be summarised in a couple of points which 
are also contained in the federal guidelines for a sound legislation:68 
- A law regulates the legal effects of those facts of the case that occur at a 
time during which the law is in force. 
Facts of the case which take place after the coming into force of a law will 
be judged according to the new law. 
- The retroactive effect (Rückwirkung) of a law is excluded. Only in special 
cases and under specific conditions69 may an order tie onerous legal 
consequences to a state of facts in the past. 
Facts of the case which last over a definite or indefinite period of time or 
which take place in several temporally separated episodes will be judged 
according to the new law for the time period after the coming into force 
of the new law. This pseudo retroactive effect (unechte Rückwirkung) is 
allowed. Yet, the already mentioned principles of security oflaw and confi-
dence are authoritative for the concretion of the transitionallaw. Above 
this, the general principle of proportionality must be bornein mind. 
- As to laws regarding facts of a case which last for an indefinite period 
of time, it must be considered whether the immediate application of the 
new law is justified. The principle of proportionality may be opposed to 
an immediate application. First of all, this is the case when the new order 
differs strongly from the old order. In such cases it may be justified to 
create a transitional arrangement. This transitional measure shall build 
a bridge between the old and the new law. Such a transitional measure 
gives consideration to the principles oflegal security and proportionality. 
In terms of procedurallaw the basic principle is that by the time of its 
coming into force procedurallaw is applicable to the current proceeding. 
-- -- ------ -- -------- --
66 HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 51), N 310 et seq.; Pierre TschannenfUlrich Zimmerli, Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrech I, znd ed., Berne 2005, p. 173 et seq. 
67 Kölz (N 6r), p. rrz et seq. 
68 
Bundesamt für Justiz, Gesetzgebungsleitfaden, 3rd ed., Berne 2007 (www.bj.admin.ch >Themen > 
Staat und Bürger > Legistik), N 655 et seq. 
6
9 Details in HäfelinfM üllerfUh lmann (N 51) , N 331; Gesetzgebungsleitfaden (N 68), N 655. 
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3.2 Usual structure of transitional measures in social security 
law 
Matters of transitionallaw are usually not in the centre of the 
legislation?o Particularities of transitional measures of a law are hardly ever the 
subject of parliamentary debates. Basically the structure of transitional mea-
sures in social security follows the general principles mentioned above. 
The characteristics are to be found in the fact that in social security law often 
facts of a case Iasting an indefinite period of time are to be judged. Therewith 
the pseudo retroactive effect of a new law almost represents the standard, 
especially when benefits for an indefinite period of time shall tie to insurance 
periods already acquired or to expectancies. Particularly in pension schemes it 
is not unusual to establish a transitional measure with special provisions. The 
same applies to the adoption of new legal institutions or new kinds ofbenefits: 
In order to be effective for all insured persons, often an introductive transitional 
measure is necessary. 
Up to now benefits of social security were rather extended than reduced. For 
this reason the new law was normally more favourable than the old law. Speak-
ing of transitional measures this is less problematic than the restriction oflegal 
positions. An authoritative guideline for the Iimitation ofbenefits is the prin-
ciple of equality and equal treatment. The more favourable rules may only be 
withheld to certain classes of insured persans for severe and objective reasons. 
On the Iimitation ofbenefits, the already mentioned principles are consulted 
as guidelines. Often attention is paid that the amount of the benefits already 
drawn will not be changed significantly. This protection of acquired rights is - as 
already mentioned above - rather a political maxim than a principle oflaw. 
The adoption of new procedurallaw does not often involve explicit transi-
tional rules. The practice had to decide according to which criteria in proceed-
ings of social security law new procedurallaw had to be applied?r Pursuant to 
the jurisdiction, new procedural provisions are basically applicable immediately 
and to the full extent with, and on the day of, coming into force unless the new 
law contains different transitional measures. This principle of transitionallaw 
is not applicable if there is no continuity between the old and the new law in 
respect of the procedurallaw systems, and if with the new law a fundamental 
new code of procedure has been created?• Furthermore, according to the princi-
ple of irreversibility of the forum (perpetuatio Jori), the competence of the court 
is determined after the point in time in which the procedure has been opened.7J 
7o Ulrich MeyerfPeter Arnold, Intertemporales Recht. Eine Bestandesaufnahme anhand der Rechtspre-
chung der beiden öffentlich-rechtlichen Abteilungen des Bundesgerichts und des Eidgenössischen 
Versicherungsgerichts, Zeitschrift für schweizerisches Recht 2005 I p. n6. 
7r MeyerfArnold (N 70), p. 135 et seq. 
72 E.g. BGE 129 V rr5 E. 2.2. 
73 MeyerfArnold (N 70), p. '37· 
531 
An exception only applies if the competent authority at the time of the opening 
of the procedure does not exist anymore.74 
3·3 Actuallegal changes introduced and accompanied by 
transitional provisions 
Up to now, in the field of social security an extension ofben-
efits could be observed far more often than a reduction ofbenefits. In case of an 
extension ofbenefits, i.e. advances of pensions, the transitionallaw normally 
defines from when and under which conditions additional benefits shall be 
granted. Usually, higher benefits became effective with the coming into force of 
the new regulation or shortly after. Advances of pensions in the compulsory old-
age and survivors insurance may be mentioned as examples. Also the expansion 
of the insurance obligation to all employees in the accident insurance, which 
came into force with the new law on accident insurance in the year of 1984, 
obtained immediate validity and granted the persons concerned an advanta-
geous solution without a transitional period.75 
Occasionally, a special rule has been created for more favourable exten-
sions ofbenefits. The 1oth revision ofthe law on old-age and survivors insur-
ance implemented in 1997 provides education benefits for times in which one 
assumes the parental care for a child under the age of 16. These benefits Iead 
to an increase of pensions. Basically, the credits were granted in their entirety 
for all times after the coming into force of the law. For the educational periods 
before that, a transitional regulation was created. The credits for the time before 
1997 had been taken only to the moiety. In addition, there was a graduation on 
age-group regarding the question who could receive credits for which number 
of years. The older the persons were, the more years which could have been 
credited. 
Only in recent years have reforms implicated noticeable reductions of 
benefits. Some examples on this include: 
With the mth revision of the Federal Law on old-age and survivors insur-
ance76, the age of retirement for women was basically increased from 62 
to 64 years. Four years after the coming into force of the revision, the age 
of retirement was increased from 62 to 63, eight years after the revision 
from 63 to 64. At the time of the coming into force of the revision the 
women expecting their retirement in four or more years knew that they 
would have to work one year longer. Women expecting their retirement in 
eight years or more knew that they would have to work two years Ionger 
altogether. Therewith, both groups had enough time to adjust to the 
modified circumstances. 
With the first revision of the Federal Law on old age, survivors and disabil-
74 BGE 130 V 90 E. 3· 
75 Jöhl (N 65), p. '35 et seq. 
76 SR 831.10. 
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ity insurance for employed persons77 in 2005, the mode of calculation of 
pensions was altered. Future pensions will be around six percent lower. 
Pensions which were fixed before the coming into force of the revision 
will not be touched by the new method of calculation. Over the next ten 
years the calculation will be adapted in small steps. Only persons who 
were at an age ofless than 55 (men) or 54 (women) in the year 2005 will 
have a full reduction at the age of their regular retirement with 65 or 64 
years. 
- With the fifth revision of the Federal Law on disability insurance78, 
which came into force on January I, 2008, the conditions for a disability 
pension have been aggravated. Many norms have been changed in a way 
to motivate the insured persons to participate more in their reintegration. 
It seems astonishing that a revisionchanging a majority of articles in an 
important law is not attended by a whole set of transitional provisions. 
One of the few transitional rules concerns the protection of acquired 
rights of the daily allowances for persons taking part in a reintegration 
program of the disability insurance. For the rest, the revision shall be 
effective in a very short time after its adoption. The disability insurance 
has enormous financial problems and the political priority has been to 
avoid a substantial amount of hew expenses. It will be interesting to see 
whether and to which degree the new conditions will have consequences 
for insured persons already receiving a pension. It is possible that the new 
conditions will be applied on these pensions by the way of revision, which 
is always possible when important factors of the calculation of a pension 
change.79 
These few examples show that the legislature in social insurance law tries in 
most cases to implement the guidelines which can be deduced from consti-
tutionallaw. The general rules for the shaping of transitional provisions are 
observed. Only the example of the fifth revision of the Federal Law on disability 
insurance will give rise to questions in practice. Especially the revision of inva-
lidity pensions which were fixed many years ago could be in contradiction with 
some of the guidelines mentioned above. 
3·4 Stability of transitional measures 
Neither legal practice nor legal doctrine has developed special 
concepts on how to deal with the change of transitional provisions. In principle, 
transitional provisions are regular legal norms. The guidelines explained above 
apply to transitional provisions as to other legal norms. 
77 SR 831.40. 
78 SR 831.20. 
79 Art. '7 of the Federal Law on the general part of social insurance, SR 830.1. 
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Nevertheless, there is a difference between ordinary legal norms and tran-
sitional norms. The latter try to solve a transitional problern for a given dass 
of individuals whose interests are specificaily protected in a situation of a legal 
change. They normaily concern a limited number of individuals. The transi-
tional provisions are sometimes very important for these individuals. A person 
planning retirement some years in advance must be sure that the transitional 
measures concerning the adaptation of the age of retirement can be relied on. 
The same is true for provisions altering the mode of calculation of pensions step 
by step. As soon as provisions of this kind have entered into force, individuals 
must be able to make use of their remaining period of professional activity to fiil 
the gaps in their level of pensions. It cannot be excluded that the courts would 
protect the individual confidence (Art. 9 Constitution), based on a rather specific 
and clear transitional measure, against a change of the transitional measures. 
Until now, the Federal Court has never taken a decision of this kind against a 
Federallaw. The theoretical arguments for a protection of individual confidence 
in a legal norm arealready discussed and supported by a number of authors . 80 
In the recent past, there have only been a limited number of adaptations of 
transitional provisions in social security. 
- Within the fourth revision of the Federal Law on disability insurance8' 
in 2003, the additional pensions for marital partners have been abol-
ished. Based on a transitional provision, the current additional pensions 
were not concerned. Insured persons who were entitled to an additional 
pension by the entrance into force of the revision did not loose their 
entitlement. Within the fifth revision of the same law, the additional 
pensionswill be abolished for this privileged group as weil on January 
I, 2008. For the persons concerned, this change could have significant 
financial effects. Normaily, they should be given enough time to adapt 
their lives and expenses to the new situation. In this special case, the 
sudden abolition of these pensions can be justified with a view to the fact 
that the persons concerned have known since 2003 that it is contrary to 
the general system to getan additional pension. The persons concerned 
could not rely on the confidence that the legislature would not change this 
privilege. In the end, they had a period of five years to take the necessary 
steps to adapt to the new situation. 
- The compulsory system ofhealth insurance was introduced for ail inhab-
itants of Switzerland in 1996. The transitional provisions have introduced 
a system of compensation for bad risks between the health insurers. This 
system was limited in time. The legislature expected an assimilation of 
risk structure of the different insurers. This expectation turned out to 
be wrong. Therefore, the system of risk compensation was prolonged for 
another five years. 82 
----------------
Bo See N 6r above. 
8
' SR 83r.2o. 
82 
Art. 105 al. 4bis of the Federal Law on health insurance, SR 8p.ro. 
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4 Executive-branch regulations 
The executive branch is very important for the concretion of 
social security law. Alllaws are supplemented by a great number of ordinances. 
Besides, there are self-governed regulations of social insurance bodies which 
cannot be attributed to the government administration. Finaily, there is also a 
large number of guidelines which support the implementation of social security 
law. These are not sources oflaw in the proper sense, but they serve the equal 
application of the law. 
The regulations of the executive are enacted either by reason of a special 
delegation8J or due to the general competence of implementation of the admin-
istrative authorities.84 In the former case the administration is bound within 
delegation, in the latter it is bound to the scope of implementation set by the 
entire order. In the latter case the regulations may not impose new rights and 
duties on individuals, which arenot already embodied in the law. Normally, 
the Iitigation whether the legal scope of delegation or the entire order has been 
observed is not about problems and questions of transitionallaw. With regard to 
the principles described in Parts 1-3, these are the same. 
The older practice of the Federal Court declared the executive bodies 
entrusted with the implementation oflegislation competent to adopt transitional 
provisions. As far as the formallaw did not contain this kind of norms the exec-
utive bodies should be allowed to create them. This practice was in contradiction 
with the principle oflegality. A change ofpractice seems probable. 85 
The self.governed regulations of social insurance bodies are basically judged 
according to the same principles as weil. All the same the social insurance 
borlies possess somewhat greater autonomy in arranging their regulations than 
the authorities. They still are bound tothelegal regulations; major changes are 
only possible in connection with exceptional cases. The most important changes 
may occur within the employee pension plan (2nd pillar) when benefits are 
adjusted by self.governed regulations. The most recent practice shows that major 
changes are also possible without the consequence that principles are thus 
considered as hurt. 86 This jurisdiction is not entirely satisfactory, especiaily in 
domains in which an intervention regarding the equivalence between contribu-
tions and thereby acquired expectancies or benefits takes place. 
Guidelines from supervisory authorities conducting the implementation 
of social security are legally binding only for administrative authorities. If the 
guidelines are evidently incorrect, even the administrative authorities may 
diverge from them.87 Moreover, the guidelines oblige neither the courts nor the 
individuals. An adjustment of the guidelines therefore has no direct implica-
8J See Art. r64 al. 2 Constitution. 
84 Art. r82 al. 2 Constitution. 
85 HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 51), N 324• with further references. 
86 Federal Court BGE 133 V 279. 
87 Thomas Locher, Grundriss des Sozialversicherungsrechts, 3rd ed., Berne 2003, p. 97 et seq. 
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tions on the insured persons. Furthermore, no new rights or duties of individu-
als may be established. So, the legal questions are to be asked basically differ-
ently from those concerning laws and regulations. 
5 Conduding remarks 
The Swiss constitutionallaw of Federation and Cantons 
contains numerous regulations which authorise and require the State to adopt 
measures in the interest of social security. The right to minimal provision of 
goods indispensable to life is a basic right. It cannot be limited by changes in 
legislation. Above all, a great part of the doctrine postulates that certain legal 
positions in the range of social security shall be mandatedunder the protection 
of the right to property. 
The obligations of the State beyond the minimal guarantees are by contrast 
rather vague. Normally, these obligations concern flexibly applicable social goals, 
which do not contain individual rights to governmental benefits. Furthermore, 
they do not provide an enforceable protection against changes in legislation to 
the disadvantage of citizens. 
Based on general principles oflaw and the constitution, in Swiss doctrine 
and practice certain guidelines concerning the introduction oflegal changes 
have been developed. Since the Swiss legal system Iacks of a control of Federal 
laws by the Federal Court88 and most questions of social security are regulated 
by Federallaw, clear decisions of the highest Court are missing regarding 
which changes in the system of social security are allowable and which are 
not. A control of the measures arranged in Switzerland by the European Court 
of Human Rights is only possible to a limited extent, because Switzerland has 
not ratified the firstadditional protocol of the ECHR. The right to property 
embodied therein could - according to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights- grant certain protection against reductions ofbenefits funded 
by contributions. 
The principle of security is not developed to an extensive degree under Swiss 
social security law. The reasons for this seem to be twofold: The first reason 
consists in the fact that up until the last five years, the prestations have always 
been extended. Therefore there was until now no academic debate about the 
legal barriers of reduction of prestations. More important than the principle of 
security were the social goals or the principles of equality and proportionality, 
which must be borne in mind by extending the level of prestations. The second 
reason lies within the already mentioned characteristic of the Swiss system 
oflegal protection, namely that Federal Laws may not be mandated under the 
control of the Federal Court. Therefore, no enforceable aspects of the principle 
of security can be strengthened. 
88 Art. 190 Constitution. 
-- ----- ---
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PART II ADMINISTRATIVE AsPEcrs 
1 Discretionary powers of the administration and their 
Iimits 
LI Preliminary remarks 
Social security is to a great extend part of public law. Therefore 
it is strongly affected by the principle oflegality (Art. 5 al. r Constitution89). This 
means that when granting benefits, institutions are bound by the law and its 
regulations. Therewith, premises under which benefits of social security are 
granted are generally set by the law.9o In the same way it is the law which defines 
character and scope ofthe benefits.9' 
However, this basic principle is not strictly followed, and the reason for it can 
be traced back to different causes: 
First of all, it is acknowledged that when granting benefits, the legal 
basis does not have to reach the same degree of precision as in govern-
mental interventions. The same precision is however needed for benefits 
which are granted periodically, or are of existential value to the persons 
concernedY 
- Secondly, one must differentiate between benefits granted by the social 
security and benefits granted by social assistance (welfare aid). Given that 
benefits from welfare aid depend on the need of the individuals, discre-
tion when granting them is likely tobe larger.93 In the following both 
categories will be considered separately. 
- Eventually, federalism and the organisational splintering of social security 
execution play an essential role. A certain margin of appreciation is given 
to cantons and individual social security institutions regarding the imple-
mentation of social security law. 
89 The Constitution ofthe Swiss Confederation of April 18,1999 (Constitution) , Official systemarte 
Collection of Swiss Legislation (SR) ro1. See for an (inofficial) english translation of the Constitution 
http:lfwww.admin.chfchfitlfrs{1/C101ENG.pdf. 
9o Thomas Locher, Grundriss des Sozialversicherungsrechts, 3rd ed., Berne 2003, p. 87 et seq. 
9' Alfred Maurer, Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Band I, Allgemeiner Teil, 2nd ed., Berne 
1983, p. 153 et seq. 
9 2 Locher (N 90) , p. 88; Ulrich HäfelinfGeorg MüllerfFelix Uhlmann, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 5th 
ed., ZurichfBaselfGeneva, N. 416. 
93 Felix Wolffers, Grundriss des Sozialhilferechts, 2. ed., Bern{Stuttgart{Wien 1999, p. 103. 
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!.2 Discretionary power in the shaping of autonomous rules 
The essential parts of social security law fall into the central 
state's authority.94 Nevertheless, there are several portions left to the cantons for 
agreeing on adapted cantonal solutions. Two of the most significant examples 
for such regulations are the individual reductions of contributions to health 
insurance95 and the regulation for a small nurober of factors having an influence 
on benefit amounts in the system of complementary benefits to the pensions of 
old- age, survivors and disability insurance.96 
Of more importance than the provisos for cantonallaw are the institution's 
scopes for regulations. In regard to the organisation, the Swiss system of social 
security is strongly split up. Most systems of social insurance are administrated 
by several institutions, which creates a climate of competition such as in the 
case of i.e. the case in the health insurance and (partially) in the accident insur-
ance system. These institutions are predominantly organised under private 
law. Their interior structure is predetermined only to a low degree by the social 
security law. Already from there it follows that a given degree of independence is 
connected to the embodiment of their activity. Nevertheless, boundaries to this 
independence appear mainly in the sectors ofhealth and accident insurances 
where premises for benefits are broadly regulated by the law. Independence in 
granting benefits is therefore first and foremost limited to the sector of comple-
mentary (non-compulsory) health and accident insurance. 
On the other hand, regulations within the sector of old-age, survivors and 
disability insurance for employed persons are of great importance. Contribu-
tions and amount ofbenefits in the so- called 'second pillar' are mainly deter-
mined by the pension fund's autonomous regulations.97 Here the law remains 
with setting minimum regulations to comply with.98 However, discretion for 
pension funds is stilllimited by their own regulations which they are obliged to 
follow.99 Nevertheless there remains a considerable freedom of choice in certain 
cases. One of the main reasons for this is certainly that pension funds were 
from the beginning organised under private law, that they were free in regulat-
ing the contributions and the prestations, and that minimum standards for their 
Ievel of contributions and prestations were implemented less than 25 years ago 
(1984)· 
94 See Part I, r.2.r. 
95 Art. 65 et seq. of the Law on health insurance (SR 832. ro) . 
96 Art. 2 al. 2, Art. 10 al. 2 , Art. rr al. 2, Art. 13 ofthe Law on complementary benefits (SR 83r.3o) . 
97 E. G. Hans-Ulrich Stauffer, Berufliche Vorsorge, ZurichfBaselfGeneva 2005, N. 254. 
98 Art. 6 et seq. ofthe old-age, survivors and disability insurance for employed persans (BVG, SR 83r. 4o) . 
99 Maurer (N 91), p. '54 et seq. 
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1.3 Discretionary powers in the granting ofbenefi.ts in sodal 
insurance 
Swiss social insurance law makes a distinction between cash 
benefits and benefits in kind. Cash benefits are in particular daily allowances, 
pensions, annual complementary benefits and destitute compensations (Art. 15 
of the federallaw on the general part of social insurance [ATSG]'00). Benefits in 
kind on the other hand are in particular curative treatrnent (nursing), adjuvant, 
individual care and rehabilitation measures, as well as expenses for transporta-
tion and similar benefits (Art. 14 ATSG). 
Characteristically cash benefits are regulated very explicitly in regulations 
and by-laws. The administration has hardly any discretionary power when it 
comes to granting cash benefits. Constrictions to this policy only result from 
the before-mentioned particularities concerning the scope available to the 
cantons in forming benefits, and the fact that benefits from the pension funds 
are defined regarding the respective regulations instead oflegal clauses. All the 
same, special rules from cantons as well as regulations from pension funds are 
of a very appointed character, which means that one can by no means speak of a 
discretionary power as such concerning the implementation of the law. 
Benefits in kind have to be considered differently. Premises are still 
mentioned by the law but a bigger scope is left for the institutions to act. 
Generally, a benefit in kind is used to impact on the insured person or hisfher 
surroundings in order to allow the person a reintegration in the respective 
surroundings.101 Normally, benefits in kind aim for an elimination of the conse-
quences generated by a social risk (such as illness, accident, unemployment). 
When deciding for which person which measures can be taken, the estimation 
of the given situation by the institution plays an important role. 
To give an example of where the administration still has a certain scope in 
granting benefits, the measures of the manpower market in the unemployment 
insurance can be named.102 Regulations concerning unemployment insurance 
have numerous benefits helping the insured to integrate into the manpower 
market (again) . Although the law states a legal claim for these benefits to the 
persons concerned, cantonal administrations retain a choice of discretion of 
which measure seems most suitable for an insured person.
10
J 
A similar statement can be made for the integration benefits from disability 
insurance. Also a claim is generally granted if the qualifications are fulfilled. 
wo SR 830.!. 
101 See Ueli Kieser, ATSG-Kommentar, ZurichfBaselfGeneva 2003, Art. '4 N. 4 · 
102 Art. 59 et seq. of the Federal Law on unemployment insurance (SR 837.0). 
'
0
3 Seefora detailed analysis Agnes Leu, Arbeitsmark tliehe Massnahmen im Rahmen der Arbeitslosenver· 
sicherungder Schweiz, ZurichfBaselfGeneva 2oo6, p. 38 et seq. 
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However, looking at the selection process of a certain measure for a dient, 
authorities of the disability insurance have considerable discretionary power. '
0
4 
Now with the 5th revision of the Federal Law on disability insurancems a real 
discretionary power has been introduced into the disability insurance system: 
Following the explicit intention of the legislature, there is a discretionary power 
of the administration for granting measures concerning early intervention 
measures. roG These measures are intended to be taken at an early point of time 
so persons can be affected in advance in their disintegration due to health or 
other problems. 
Benefits in kind in health insurance are described dearly and in a final way 
by the law and several decrees and by-laws. Institutions have no discretion-
ary power in deciding ifbenefits will be granted or not. However, looking at 
the facts shows that due to competition between health insurers, benefits are 
granted which do not precisely fall in a certain dass oflegal benefits. This prac-
tice is unlawful,'o7 is in contradiction to the principle oflegalityms and in general 
it can only be avoided by means of control over health insurers. 
r.4 Discretionary powers in the granting of social assistance 
As mentioned earlier, the cantons are in charge of social assist-
ance. ro9 Therefore many different systems have been created throughout the 
cantons. One thing all systems have in common is the continuous extension of 
pretensions to Welfare aid into legal daims. no In all cantons, individuals have 
legal daims to defined benefits exceeding the minimum of Art. 12 Constitu-tion.nr 
The margin within this issue is to be divided into three different kinds: 
Benefits of social assistance can either be granted as cash benefits or 
benefits in kind. Most systems aim for individually adapted cash benefits 
being granted in the first place in order to allow persons in need to 
purchase goods they need themselves."' Nevertheless almost all cantons 
provide the opportunity to grant welfare aid to persons in need by supply-
ing them directly with benefits in kind instead of cash. Generally the 
administration has discretionary power to decide if premises are existent 
for granting benefits in kind. Usually, such discretionary decisions can 
-- --
T0 4 Ulrich Meyer, Bundesgesetz über die Invalidenversicherung (IVG), Rechtsprechung des Bundes-
gerichts, Zurich 1997, p. 56 et seq. 
ros SR 83r.2o. 
'
06 
Art. 7d al. 3 of the Federal Law on disability insurance. 
'
0
7 See Art. 34 al. r ofthe Federal Law on health insurance (SR 8p.ro). 
roS Locher (N 90), p. 88. 
'
0
9 See Part I, 1.2.2 . 
rro Wolffers (N 93) , p. 90 et seq. 
rrr See Part I, r.3. 
rrz Wolffers (N 93), p. 128 et seq . 
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be checked by a cantonal court; however, the courts restrain themselves 
strongly in doing so. 
Moreover, personal aid in cases where the distress is not only of a finan-
cial nature is granted in all cantons along side the benefits needed for 
economic requirements. These prestations are, for example, advisory 
Services or certain integration measures. Corresponding to the statements 
made regarding the integration benefits of the unemployment insurance 
and the disability insurance, it can be said that discretionary power to 
decide which personal, individual aid is to be granted is more extensive 
than discretionary power in granting financial help.rrJ 
However, in practice the largest margins of discretionary power lie in the 
appraisal of the needs required by a person. Even if the law describes at 
times exactly which factors (income, capital, expenses) aretobe consid-
ered when measuring the indigence, there is a considerable margin in 
how detailed darifications are done by the respective administration. This 
is no discretionary power in the legal sense but a result of differences in 
the practical execution. These differences in practice can lead to different 
degrees of welfare aid in cantons although legal regulations are similar to 
each other. 
To condude, it is to be said that discretionary power of administrations is by far 
m ore substantial in the field of social assistance than it is in social insurance 
law. 
1.5 limits of discretionary power 
The absolute limit of discretionary power in granting benefits 
is given by the right to aid in distress. Under no circumstances can discretion-
ary power be misused in a way that violates the minimal guaranty of Art. 12 
Constitution.rr1 Because administration has, as shown before, mainly discretion-
ary power in the area of in kind benefits and personal aid, the aspects regarding 
personal assistance and care mentioned in Art. 12 Constitution are of major 
importance in limiting the discretionary power. 
As far as discretionary power is available to institutions and administra-
tion, it has tobe carried out dutiful. This implies a strict adherence to consti-
tutional principles (Arts. 5 and 9 Constitution) and indudes in particular also 
the principle of proportionality. Because administration and institutions can 
only grant different benefits when factual reasons are apparent, the principle of 
equality before the law (Art. 8 Constitution) is of importance too. It follows that 
legal boundaries exist even in areas with amounts of remaining discretionary 
power.rrs 
rr3 Wolffers (N 93), p. 124. 
rr4 Part I, r.3. 
rrs E.g. HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 92) , N. 441 et seq. 
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Regarding the granting ofbenefits, cases can normally be controlled upon 
discretionary power by courts oflower instance. Nevertheless control of discre-
tionary power is, in all cases, carried out with abstinence.n6 This distinct judicial 
self-restraint in reviewing the discretion of administrations strengthens the 
power of the administration. 
2 Administrative decisions and legal changes 
The generalproblern oflegal changes and their effect on exist-
ing legal relationships has already been discussed;n7 however, individual aspects 
of protection for legitimated expectations have been examined in their general 
relation tothelegal system. Now the point is to see what impact a legal change 
at a later point in time has upon an administrative decision which has already 
been taken. Moreover, this section is not about the case where a decision is 
already faulty at the time of its pronouncement; this question will be treated in 
Section 3· Here it concerns fully correct decisions which seem questionable only 
through a subsequent legal change. 
2.1 Singular and short termed prestations 
An administrative decision is usually valid under the law in 
force at the moment when it is taken. Even when legal changes occur shortly 
after the decision, it is assessed under the law in force at the moment when it 
was rendered. On the other hand, decisions with consequences (of a normally 
financial nature) continuing when the new law becomes effective are treated 
differently. These are prestations granted for a long-term period of time (e.g. 
pensions and destitute compensations) and will be discussed in Section b. 
Social security law includes many prestations which are specifically granted 
for a certain function at a certain point in time. Examples are the costs for health 
care or measures in the manpower market. As far as qualifications are fulfilled 
for the granting ofbenefits, a new law can under no circumstances effect a reim-
bursement or an additional granting ofbenefits. A retroactive effect ofthat kind 
would violate basic constitutional principles such as those already mentioned in 
Part 1. 118 
2.2 Long-termed prestations 
On the other hand, the termination of prestations in kind 
granted for a long-term period of time (such as re-education in disability insur-
ance or long-lasting health treatments from accident or disease) cannot be 
116 E.g. HäfelinfMüllerfUhlmann (N 92), N. 473 et seq. 
117 Part I, 3· 
118 Part I, 2. 3· 
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barred in the case of a new law coming into force which no Ionger contains the 
relevant prestations. However, a constriction would have to be explicitly intended 
by the new law and could not affect the general minimal standards of protection 
derived from the constitution. 
It is to say that as far as the Federal Law on the general part of the social 
insurance law (ATSG) is applicable,n9 valid long-term benefits can only be 
reduced or abrogated when the basis of the facts changes (Art. I7 al. 2 ATSG). 
It follows from the explicit reference to the basis of the facts that prestations 
cannot be reduced or abrogated by a simple legal change; at least if no explicit 
provision of the new law contains a different provision. '2 0 
In practice the most important cases oflong-term prestations are pensions. 
Changes can affect disability pensions in particular. Concerning their adap-
tation, there is a special clause in Art. I7 al. I ATSG. It says that disability 
pensions aretobe adapted when the grade of disability has changed in a signifi-
cant way since the adjudication of the pension. The grade of disability is defined 
by the comparison of the income a person could earn without health damages 
and the income a disabled person could still earn. Basis for the calculation of the 
disability pension is an economical comparison between two incomes. There-
fore , the assumption that only changes in the factual basis and not subsequent 
changes of the law can lead to an actual adaptation of the pension is justified. 
As mentioned in the first part, regulations regarding the legal situation of 
disability have been adjusted by the 5th revision of the Federal Law on disabil-
ity insurance, in force since January Ist 2008. With the restatement of Art. 7 
ATSG (incapacity to work) requirements for disability'2T should be tightened in 
the future. This is a legal change which should not have any effect on disability 
pensions which are already paid. Nevertheless, it is probable that due to tight-
ened practice, disability is appraised tougher under the new law. Therefore, a 
reappraisal within the revision would Iead to a tightened assessment of the grade 
of disability. It follows that in a concrete case, a tightening ofthelegal basis 
could very welllead to an indirect adaptation of the disability pensions. 
Article I7 ATSG is not valid for the sector of the federal system for old-age, 
survivors and disability insurance for employed persons (second pillar), but 
similar warranties can be deduced from the transitionallaw of this system: 
Generally, prestations already granted are immune against later adaptations by 
the law (Art. 91 of the Federal Law on old-age, survivors and disability insurance 
for employed persons [BVG]'22). Moreover, specialattentionwas given in not 
119 Following the system ofapplicability based on Art. 2 ATSG, the Federal Law on the generat part of 
social insurance law is - generally speaking - applicable in all federal systems of social security except 
the federal system for old-age, survivors and disability insurance for employed persons. 
'
2
° Kieser (N ror) , Art. 17 N. 5· 
'
2
' The restatement of the notion of incapacity to werk is relevant as well for clauses of disability through 
the link in Art. 8 al. r ATSG. 
T22 SR 83!.40. 
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touching currently running disability pensions within the first revision of this law.''3 
3 Binding effects of administrative decisions 
3.1 Preliminary remarks 
Being to a great extend part of Swiss administrative law, its 
principle that administrative decisions become formally valid when they cannot 
be Contested anymore is also true for social security law. Yet these acts can still 
be contested under specific conditions. ''4 However, a countermand can only be 
considered when the administrative decision is an incorrect one. ''5 This constel-
lation has to be distinguished from the case where facts which would have led 
to another decision only come to light after the administrative decision has been 
taken. In those cases a revision of the relevant decision can be demanded from 
persons affected by it (Art. 53 al. r ATSG). Since these revisions are based on 
demands of the insured persons and generally lead to more favourable results, 
they will not be treated here any further. 
In either case consideration of the interests is needed for abrogating or 
revising an administrative act. Interests being weight against each other are the 
interest for correct application of the law against the interest for security oflaw 
and protection of confidence.rz6 Excluded from the possibility of alteration are 
only certain types of administrative acts. Just two of these types must be consid-
ered in conjunction with prestations from social security law: on the one hand, 
there is the case where a legal decision concerning the administrative act has 
been taken by a tribunal;''7 on the other hand, the law itself can include a clause 
which prohibits a revocation for certain acts.rz8 
3.2 Binding effects concerning the affiliation to a social 
security system 
Swiss social insurance law knows only three categories of 
insured persons: unemployed persons, employed persons and self-employed per-
sons. Depending on additional qualifications (such as a certain minimum salary 
or a minimum age required for pension funds) classification for a social system 
is determined within these three categories. The qualification of an occupation 
follows in general the qualification by the legal old-age insurance, where all 
rz3 Transitional provision within ISt Revision, lit f. al. I 
rz 4 See Part II, 3·5· 
"5 E.g. Häfelin(Müller(Uhlmann (N 92), N. 998. 
"
6 
E.g. Häfelin(Müller{Uhlmann (N 92), N. 997· 
"7 E.g. Häfelin(Müller(Uhlmann (N 92), N. I025 et seq. 
r zB E.g. Häfelin(Müller{Uhlmann (N 92), N. roo5 et seq. 
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categories of persons are insured. Therefore the decision of the authorities of 
the old-age insurance is of major (factual) importance. In particular the distinc-
tion between employed persons and self-employed persons has an impact on the 
compulsory protection of insured persons: Self-employed persons are only affili-
ated with the compulsory public insurances for the whole population (old-age 
insurance, disability insurance, health insurance), whereas employed persons 
are protected by more specialised and broader developed employee insurances 
such as accident insurance, unemployment insurance and old-age, survivors and 
disability insurance for employed persons (pension funds).''9 
Certain fl.exibility is also characteristic of the system of affiliation: The affili-
ation with a system does not follow a person; it follows the qualifications of any 
single occupation of a person. Therefore it is not unusual that a person is consid-
ered for different occupations as employed and self-employed at the same time. 
Even if the classification of an occupation is important it never has a definite 
character. A classification to a certain social security system is only valid as long 
as important facts or criteria regarding the occupation do not change. Insofar 
classification to a certain system does not play such an important role as may be 
the case in other countries. 
Nevertheless it can be said that for reasons oflegal certainty, changes from 
qualifications of occupations in self-employed and employed are rarely under-
taken by the responsible institution of the old- age insurance.'3a Therefore the 
first classification of an occupation into a certain category is of factual impor-
tance as long as the occupation does not undergo an important change (e.g. 
employment of a formerly self-employed person by a company for the same 
occupation). 
3·3 Binding effects concerning the granting ofbenefits 
There is a consistent regulation for binding effects on an 
administrative act for branches of social insurances bound by Federal Law on 
the general part of the social insurance law. As per Art. 53 al. 2 ATSG, an insur-
ance authority can get back to a formal valid act if it is unquestionably incorrect 
and a rectification is of significant value. The formulation of the just mentioned 
premises is - in comparison to the general premises for revocation of adminis-
trative acts - slightly more restrictive. An administrative act is unquestionably 
lacking in correctness when the law is applied in a wrong way. Notseen as obvi-
ously incorrect is an administrative act where only the administrative practice 
has since changed or when discretion has been carried out in an unusual way. 
Moreover it must be pointed out that the decision if a revocation is of consid-
erable value can not be schematised. A slight discrepancy from a long-term 
"9 Locher (N 90), p. 165 et seq. 
'3° Ueli Kieser, Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Zurich(St. Gallen 2008, N. 45 · 
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granted pension can for instance be of considerable value. By no means are high 
demands to be placed on the term 'of considerable value'.'l' 
On the law of pension funds the general part of the federal social security 
law is in general not applicable. Furthermore, pension funds have no right to 
take administrative acts; they act as normal private persons. Therefore the auto-
regulations of the pension funds are applied instead of the mentioned principles 
from administrative law when errors become noticeable. As a general rule, later 
alteration of incorrectly calculated prestations is subsequently possible. 
3·4 Unduly paid benefits 
Unlawfully drawn benefits have to be refunded. Formost 
branches of social insurance, this principle can be deduced from Art. 25 ATSG. 
For pension funds the relevant clause can be found in Art. 35a BVG. Both, cash 
benefits and benefits in kind have to be refunded up to the full amount of paid 
or compensated benefits. 
However, ifhardship is present and benefits have been received in good 
faith, a refund is not needed (Art. 25 al. I ATSG, Art. 35a Abs. I BVG). To derive 
from good faith is when awareness of an illegal drawing ofbenefits is missing 
and justifiable under the given circumstances. Concretion to the term of 'signifi-
cant hardship' can be found in Art. 5 ATSV.'JZ This regulation has been formed 
in a way that the financial situation of a person having to refund benefits has to 
be considerably good in order to deny the existence of a significant hardship. 
As far as no specific regulations exist in cantanal social assistance laws, 
general rules for revocation of administrative acts can be applied. However, in 
social assistance the question if or under which circumstances, prestations are 
to be paid back in the case of subsequent proof of unfulfilled qualifications is 
usually in the foreground. Cantans have different regulations on this issue. 
Some cantans have special regulations for the case of drawn benefits in good 
faith with an existence of a significant hardship for the relevant person, but 
almost all cantans perceive illegally granted benefits as refundable. 'll 
3·5 'Rulings' in social security 
As described in the beginning, the principle oflegality is 
relevant in most parts of social security law. Almost every kind of ruling creates 
a constellation of tension regarding this principle. Therefore communication 
on certain points between insured persans and institutions is limited to narrow 
scope.'l4 Three examples for this narrow scope of application for rulings are: 
' l ' Locher (N 90), p. 468 et seq. 
' J2 Verordnung über den Allgemeinen Teil des Sozialversicherungsrechts (SR 83o.rr). 
'll Wolffers, (N 93), p. r8r. 
'l4 C.f. Ueli Kieser, Allgemeiner Teil, in: Ulrich Meyer (ed.), Soziale Sicherheit, 2nd ed., Basel{Genevaf 
Munich 2007, N. 63 et seq. 
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Since 2003 the Federal Law on the general part of social insurance 
contains an explicit regulation for comparison (Art. 50 ATSG), valid for 
branches of social insurances being subordinated to this law. This provi-
sion allows insurers and authorities to reach a settlement with an insured 
person when disputes concerning benefits arise (Art. 50 al. I ATSG). 
Hence, the comparison has tobe confirmed in the form of an administra-
tive act by the authority concerned (Art. 50 al. 2 ATSG). Normally it can be 
appealed against this confirmation. Moreover, it follows from the history 
of this provision that settlements should only be possible for benefits from 
insurances and not for contributions to them. The explicit reason for this 
regulation has its origin in the consideration of protecting social insur-
ance authorities from to much pressure coming from important employ-
ers. The possibility for settlement in a trial before a tribunal although 
has been extended through practice to disputes concerning benefits and 
contributions at the same time'J5. However, settlements concerning contri-
butions alone are - also in court - still not allowed. 
- For some employers the formal correct accounting with the authorities of 
social insurance is not proportional to the contributions which have to be 
paid. Therefore administrative easement is implemented in severallaws 
for cases in which only small incomes are insured or salaries are paid 
only irregularly. The aim herewith is to simplify accounting for employ-
ers with insurances by decreasing the requirements of the law. Employers 
normally have to apply for these easements with the authorities; this can 
be understood as a small field in which a kind of administrative ruling is 
possible. 
Communication with the institutions of the old-age insurance concern-
ing the question ofhow certain occupations aretobe classified (mean-
ing which regulations are to be applied, the ones for self-employed or for 
employed occupations) is still not possible, although strongly requested 
by practice. Until a significant change of practice coming from the 
Federal Court in 2006, the responsible institutions even refused to take 
an administrative act in advance, before somebody took up his occupa-
tion.'J6 Forthisperson it remained unclear how the occupation would be 
classified until the authorities qualified it. Since the change of practice 
at least future self-employed persans have the right to receive a binding 
administrative act concerning the question whether they will be classified 
as employed or as self-employed persons. However, neither margin for 
negotiation exists here: decisions are made by the institutions in charge of 
the old-age insurance. 
TJ5 BGE '3' V 4'7· 
TJ6 BGE 1}2 V 257· 
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4 Consequences of non-infonnation or incorrect 
infonnation 
4.1 Consequences of incorrect infonnation 
The Swiss system of social security is - as with most social 
security systems - complex in structure and difficult to understand for the 
insured persons. However, benefits coming from social insurances and social 
assistance are in most cases of exceptional value for them. Therefore infor-
mation provided by the administration is of major importance to the insured 
persons. 
Insured persons getting incorrect information are protected by the principle 
of protection of confidence (Art. 9 Constitution). The principle of protection 
of confidence has through a long-standing legal practice been approved by the 
Federal Court in administrative law as weil as in social security law. '37 
The following qualifications have to be fulfilled for a successful appeal to 
protection of confidence: 
The administration must have acted in a specific situation with regard to a 
specific person. 
The administration had to be either in charge of giving the information 
or it should have seemed, for good reasons to the concerned person, as the 
responsible one for providing them. 
· The incorrectness of the information could not have been detected by the 
concerned person without further difficulties. 
Relying upon the provided information, arrangements must have been 
made which cannot be cancelled harmlessly. 
Legal order has not changed since the providing of the information. 
If someone has trusted in information provided by the responsible authority and 
this information subsequently turns out to be wrong, appeal on protection of 
confidence is allowed. In these cases insured persons will be looked at as if the 
relevant wrong information was correct. '38 
4.2 The duty to inform in Swiss social security law 
For all branches subordinated to the Federal Law on the general 
part of social insurance law a provision concerning the duty to clarify and advise 
has been created. This provision reaches beyond the mentioned practice regard-
ing the protection of confidence. '39 
' 37 Locher (N 90), p. 88 et seq.; Maurer (N 91), p. 16o et seq. 
'J
8 Locher (N 90), p. 89 et seq. 
'39 Raymond Spira, Du droit d'etre renseigne et conseille par les assureurs et les organes d'execution des 
assurances sociales (Art. 27 LPGA), SZS 2001, p. 524 et seq.; Ulrich Meyer, Grundlagen, Begriff und 
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A duty of persons in charge of social insurance is to provide adequate 
general information to persons interested in their rights and duties (Art. 27 al. r 
ATSG). Beyond that every person has the right to specific information concern-
ing his specific case (Art. 27 al. 2 ATSG). Normally no fee is charged for this 
information. If institutions find out about the insured's right (or the right of 
his relatives) to benefits from other institutions, the person concerned must be 
informed immediately (Art. 27 al. 3 ATSG).'4° The main aim ofthis regulation is 
to improve accessibility to the system of social security by creating an obligation 
of advice for institutions and persons in charge of the administration of social 
insurance. 
The meaning of this provision has already had to be examined several times 
by the Federal Court. In 2005 an important judgment was made defining the 
obligation to advise every single person on their personal rights and duties in a 
very broad way (BGE 131 V 472). Referring tothislegal practice, insured persons 
have a right to specific information regarding their personal situation in order to 
assert their rights. The omission to provide the insured persons with the infor-
mation has - following the practice of the federal court - the same consequences 
as wrong information. Therewith the obligation on information according to 
Art. 27 al. 2 ATSG has clearly been linked to the already described protection of 
confidence in terms of Art. 9 Constitution. For administrations this new prac-
tice is feit as a noticeable extra burden due to the additional information which 
has to be provided in any case. For the insured persons being overstrained by 
the system of social security though, it is a clear change for the better. 
However, the institution's obligation of advice is limited to its own branch 
of insurance. Instruction is essential though when the institution detects the 
insured's right to benefits from other institutions. Nevertheless institutions are 
not obligated to search specifically for such further benefits.'4' 
Apart from the 'right to advice' dealt with in Art. 27 al. 2 ATSG there are 
other regulations stating specific obligations of advice. According to Art. 23 al. 
3 ATSG, institutions have to warn insured persons of possible consequences 
resulting from a denial ofbenefits. Moreover an explanation of consequences 
is necessary for the case of an insured person refusing to cooperate regarding 
the searching of the real facts (Art. 43 al. 3 ATSG). In addition, specific regula-
tions exist including an even more detailed obligation for providing information 
on the side of the insured person in order to protect them from a loss of their 
rights.'42 
--------------- - - - --- --- -
Grenzen der Beratungspflicht nach Art. 27 Abs. 2 ATSG, in: Rene SchaffhauserfFranz Schlauri (Ed.), 
Sozialversicherungsrechts tagung 2006, St. Gallen 2006, p. 9 et seq. 
'4° Jacques-Andre Schneider, Informationsetconseils a l'assurance dans les assurances sodales: le 
tournant de Ia LPGA, in Bettina Kahil-Wolff (Ed.), La partie generale du droit des assurances sociales, 
Lausanne 2003, p. 37 et seq, 85. 
'
4
' Locher (N 90), p. 431. 
'42 Kieser (N 130), N. 23 et seq. 
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The rights to information described above have to be understood in conjunc-
tion with another principle of Swiss social insurance law: For someone want-
ing to get prestations from social insurance it is necesary to apply for it hirnself 
and to pay attention to the correct and relevant form of the application (Art. 29 
ATSG). The right to individual information can only come into force when the 
process has been started by an appropriate application.'4J Once the proceeding 
has started though, the said rights to information become effective. 
Some obligations on information for insured persons exist as well in pension 
fund regulations. Information requirements have broadly been regulated since 
2005 in Art. 86b BVG. This norm names the issues in which pension funds are 
obliged to provide regular information. However no general obligation to provide 
advice like the one deduced from Art. 27 al. 2 ATSG is implemented in this field. 
At least a similar duty of the pension funds could be deduced from the contract 
between the employer and the pension fund, the additional contract between 
the employee and the pension fund or the autonomous regulation of the pension 
fund. 
Furthermore these obligations arenot directly applicable on the sector of 
social assistance. Usually the cantons do not stipulate obligations to provide 
advice in their social assistance laws. Nevertheless an obligation on informa-
tion can - from case to case - be derived from cantonal process law. Moreover, 
certain social administration obligations on information towards persons in 
need can be deduced from the principles of equity and good faith. 
5 Conduding remarks 
In the practice of social security law many principles of the 
administrative law are applied. The fact that several benefits from social security 
are of existential value to insured persons and persons in need is evidenced by 
various particularities. Compared to other areas oflaw, the shift of emphasis is 
mainly shown in the comprehension of the principle oflegality, the particulari-
ties in practicing the principle of proportionality and in the growing importance 
of protection of confidence. 
- When defining the principle oflegality there is reference to the uncon-
tested thesis which says that the principle is true for benefits of existential 
value like in interference into one's rights. A high degree oflegal certainty 
is demanded for regulations of prestations in social security law. 
- The principle of proportionality shows results on different Ievels: Quali-
fications for revocation of an administrative act in social security law are 
harder to fulfil than in other areas of administrative law. Furthermore 
there is a strong privilege for the legal situation of persans having drawn 
benefits unlawfully but in good faith. A refund is only necessary when 
no hardship results from it. This is true for the sector of social security 
---~~--
'43 Locher (N 90), p. 430. 
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as weil as for the area of social assistance. Moreover, concrete protection 
of such a beneficiary could be supported additionally by the protection of 
confidence. 
- In social security law, the principle of protection of confidence is of major 
importance. Information and advice provided by the relevant administra-
tion can form possible grounds for confidence. Furthermore, application 
of the obligation on information has been broadened to a duty to inform 
for administrations by the recent legal practice. Even omitted informa-
tion can form grounds for confidence. Furthermore, lack of information 
can result in a situation where the insured person is put in a situation as 
if the information had been provided correctly. It can also be understood 
as an expression of the principle of confidence that long-term prestations 
normally don't have to be adapted in case of a legal change; except where a 
change is explicitly intended. 
In conclusion it can be said that for the application of social security law there is 
no principle of security as such. Nevertheless many other principles affirm that 
one's possible existential needs of security are covered. Compared to other areas 
oflaw, it is rather a shift of emphasis than a fundamental difference in access to 
the issue. 
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